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In June, the Cuban government reported that bad weather and extreme shortages of almost all
needed imports caused another sharp drop in agricultural production this year, leading to the
poorest sugar harvest in more than three decades. As a result, the economic decline which began
in 1990 is not expected to reach bottom until early next year, and no recovery is expected to begin
until at least late 1994. To confront the crisis, since July the government announced a series of new
economic measures, which, taken together, amount to a radicalization of the process of economic
reform begun in 1990. Among other things, the government has legalized the use of US dollars
for some limited trade on the island, authorized the operation of family-sized private businesses
for crafts and services, and announced a plan to break up many state farms into autonomous
agricultural cooperatives to be run independently by workers. Although still limited in scope, the
measures are seen as the first steps toward the establishment of a mixed economy in Cuba, with
even more reforms likely to emerge in the coming months. Cuban officials now stress that, although
the government has not abandoned its commitment to a centrally planned economy, the economic
crisis is forcing it to accept "market reforms" for the sake of economic survival. Economic recovery
set back another year The loss of subsidized markets in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
has hurtled Cuba into its worst economic crisis since Fidel Castro's government came to power in
1959. Until 1989, communist-bloc countries accounted for about 85% of Cuba's foreign trade. But
by 1992, Cuba's trade with its former communist partners shriveled to about 7% of its previous
value. That, combined with shrinking world markets for Cuban sugar and declining international
prices, crippled the country's purchasing power. The total value of Cuba's imports fell from US$8.1
billion in 1989 to just US$2.2 billion in 1992 (see Chronicle 02/18/93). The drop in imports in turn
dramatically cut production across the board, since extreme fuel shortages and lack of nearly all
needed inputs and equipment virtually ground machinery to a halt, especially in the agricultural
sector. About 70% of Cuba's annual sugar harvest is cut and processed by petroleum-run machines,
such as tractors and sugar mills. But in 1992, Cuba only managed to purchase about 6 million
metric tons of oil, less than half the annual 13 million MT it imported prior to 1989. Consequently,
production of sugar Cuba's principal export product which accounts for nearly 80% of the island's
annual foreign income dropped from the pre- 1989 yearly average of about 8 million MT to about
7 million MT in 1992 (see Chronicle 06/03/93). The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) whose
Latin American bureau has closely followed economic conditions in Cuba now estimates that
country's GDP has contracted by more than 40% since 1989. "Chronic shortages of food, medicine,
fuel, and consumer goods are now commonplace," said Brian Latell, the CIA officer in charge of
Latin American affairs who testified before the US Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence in
July. "The regime should be able to prevent large-scale starvation, but the impact on the populace
has been devastating." This year, the Cuban government hoped to brake the economic decline and
at least begin a process of economic recuperation by year-end. In fact, in January the government
optimistically dubbed 1993 "The Year of Economic Recovery." But in June, the government reported
that this year's sugar harvest plummeted by 40% dropping from 7 million MT in 1992 to just 4.2
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million MT representing the worst sugar crop in more than 30 years. As a result, the government
now estimates that export income will fall by another US$450 million this year. The total value of
imports is expected to decline to about US$1.7 billion by year-end, a 23% drop compared to the US
$2.2 billion in imports in 1992, and just one-fifth the value of annual imports prior to 1989. At the
beginning of the year, CUBAAZUCAR the state-run company in charge of marketing Cuba's sugar
had already estimated that the 1993 harvest would fall to just below 6 million MT due to the scarcity
of fuel and inputs, as well as chronic labor shortages in rural areas. The government expected to
offset the drop in sugar output with income from alternative foreign exchange earning sectors of
the economy, especially tourism. But adverse weather conditions since March greatly worsened
problems throughout the agricultural sector. On March 13, a tropical storm ravaged the island,
wiping out much of the country's sugar cane and tobacco crops and causing an estimated US$1
billion in damages. Then, throughout May and June torrential rains destroyed even more crops and
disrupted the cane harvest. Some 40 sugar mills were completely shut down for most of June, about
half of which were damaged by floods, leading to costly and time- consuming repairs. Consequently,
the government could not meet its contracted sugar sales to most foreign countries throughout June
and July, and in some cases such as with China contracts were completely cancelled. The suspension
of sugar sales in turn aggravated the fuel crisis even more in July and August, since imports were
temporarily scaled back. Fuel shipments were slowed from Russia, for example, which last year
signed a sugar-for-oil barter deal with Cuba that commits Russia to provide the island with about 2.5
million MT of petroleum in exchange for about 1.5 million MT of sugar. In July, authorities increased
the rotating four-hour per day power cuts previously in force in Havana to 10 hours per day, and
the blackouts were extended to other cities and rural areas as well. By August, the power cuts were
increased to up to 16 hours daily in the capital, paralyzing many offices and factories and disrupting
normal life in private homes. Moreover, the March-June natural disasters also devastated basic food
crops. Some 3,400 hectares of lands planted with vegetables and tuber staple crops such as potatoes
were destroyed in central and eastern Cuba. The government reports that in the first four months
of the year, production of garden produce and tubers fell by 138,000 MT compared to the same time
period in 1992. Potatoes, for example, fell by 18,400 MT. Finally, complicating the government's
financial woes even more, a mysterious health epidemic affected more than 40,000 people this year,
costing the government about US$50 million in medical costs to treat patients and set up adequate
prevention programs. The epidemic, which impairs vision and damages the nervous system, is
apparently caused in part by nutritional deficiency, highlighting the drop in living standards among
the Cuban population. The government spent about US$17 million since January just to import
essential vitamins for distribution among the population as part of the prevention program. As
a result, most independent economists predict another substantial drop in GDP this year. "The
economic consequences of all this are frankly disastrous," said Andrew Zimbalist, an economist
from Smith College and a specialist on Cuba. Zimbalist estimates that the economy will contract by
at least 10% in 1993. Indeed, government spokespersons now admit that the economic decline will
not touch bottom until at least the beginning of next year, and no economic recovery is expected
until the end of 1994. "I think, and maybe I'm being fairly bold, that perhaps a zero growth rate
can be achieved at the beginning of next year," said Octavio Castillo, vice-president of the State
Committee for Economic Cooperation (Comite Estatal de Colaboracion Economica, CECE). "And
we'll have to see whether the economy can achieve positive growth rates in the second half of that
year." Government accelerates economic reforms The continuing economic decline has forced the
government to adopt a series of new measures since July to confront the crisis. The measures, which
taken together represent a radicalization of the process of economic reform which the government
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initiated in 1990, are generally aimed at laying the basis for economic growth once recovery finally
begins to take hold. "Life and reality oblige us to do what we would never have done otherwise,"
said Fidel Castro in a nationally televised speech on July 26 to commemorate the 40th anniversary
of the guerrilla attack on the Moncada barracks, which marked the initiation of the revolutionary
movement in 1953. "We have serious problems and we have to resolve them to survive. There are
not nor can there be miracle formulas." In his speech, Castro announced two landmark initiatives:
reforms to the country's legal code which would allow Cubans to use US dollars for purchases in
specially-designated government stores, and an easing of immigration policies to permit a much
greater number of Cuban exiles to visit the island on a regular basis. Both measures are principally
aimed at earning hard currency for the government by flushing US dollars out of the black market
and into government coffers, while encouraging exiles to either send more dollar remittances to
their relatives back home or come to the island to spend their money. "Increasing our hard currency
income is a vital necessity for the country," said Castro in his speech. "We don't have any choice
but to adapt our minds to these realities." Until now, the state outlawed the possession of dollars
by Cubans, and violators could be given stiff fines and even prison terms. But the opening of the
economy to foreign investment in 1991 and the steady growth in foreign tourism to the island
led to a dual economy, whereby foreigners could spend hard currency in a chain of well-stocked
government- controlled dollar stores. In contrast, Cubans were only permitted to spend local
currency on the domestic market where there is a chronic scarcity of nearly all basic goods. Not
surprisingly, a flourishing black market in dollars emerged. Although the Cuban peso officially
remains on a parity with the US dollar, the black market exchange now hovers between 60 and 70
pesos per US dollar, up from 40 pesos per US$1.00 in December 1992. According to conservative
estimates, a minimum of US$300 million and possibly up to US$1 billion in hard currency now
floats clandestinely throughout the Cuban economy. By allowing Cubans to spend their dollars in
government- run hard currency stores, the state expects to sop up most of the foreign exchange
already on the black market, while encouraging a major increase in the flow of dollars and other
currency to the country. At the same time, the measure should alleviate some social pressures,
since many Cubans were frustrated at being barred from the "diplomat stores." "The basic idea
is that people having hard currency should not be punished...that any citizen who receives hard
currency in any legal way, whether through a tip from tourists of from a relative abroad, should
have the right to use it," explained Carlos Lage, head of the executive committee which supervises
economic cabinet ministers (Secretario del Comite Ejecutivo del Consejo de Ministros). "On the
other hand, it's going to produce an increase in hard currency receipts, and the country needs
that." In fact, Zimbalist says the estimated US$250 million per year which Cubans now receive
from relatives abroad "could easily double or triple" under the dollar legalization. "The currency
move is an attempt to bring as much of the underground economy as possible aboveground so
they can follow it and control it," said Zimbalist. Meanwhile, the decision to allow more dollarbearing Cuban exiles to visit the country already led to a huge increase in the number of requests for
visas by Cuban residents in the US. According to travel agencies in Miami handling tours to Cuba,
from July-August the number of visas granted to individuals booking flights to Cuba quintupled.
Miami travel agents estimate that if present trends continue, by year-end at least 10,000 tourists
the majority Cuban residents from Miami and other parts of the US will visit the island. Indeed,
United Airlines which inaugurated its first Miami-Havana round trip flights in September after
finally receiving approval from the US government to operate four flights per week estimates it
will transport at least 20,000 people to the island by December, including 10,000 individuals from
the US and 10,000 from other countries with routes through Miami. Notwithstanding the initial
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increase in travellers and dollars entering the country, the US economic embargo against Cuba will
greatly deter any massive influx of dollars to the island. On the one hand, the embargo only permits
Cuban families in the US to send a total of US$300 to their relatives in Cuba every three months.
On the other hand, travel restrictions to the island greatly limit the number of visitors to Cuba
regardless of whether potential travellers have been granted visas. According to Peter Torralba,
head of United Airlines' operations in Miami and the Caribbean, if the US restrictions against
flights to Cuba were lifted, about 5,000 to 6,000 people would travel daily to Havana. Although
the full impact of the dollar legalization remains to be seen, the July measures ushered in more
economic reforms in August and September. In early August, the government replaced the heads
of the ministries of agriculture, sugar, and communications, as well as the director of the State
Finance Committee, constituting the broadest shakeup of the economic cabinet in years. The
appointments reflected a new emphasis on promoting younger technocrats with demonstrated
skills and achievements to key posts to carry forward the process of reforms now underway. In
September, the government announced two more landmark initiatives: permission for family-sized
private businesses to operate for the first time since the 1960's, and a decision to break up many
large state farms into autonomous agricultural cooperatives to be run independently by workers.
Both measures are aimed at increasing production by granting individuals and autonomous
collective enterprises freedom to produce goods and services that the state either cannot provide,
or can no longer manage efficiently. "Individually run workshops and productive centers have
become a necessity," said Osvaldo Martinez, director of Cuba's Center for Investigations on the
World Economy (Centro de Investigaciones de la Economia Mundial, CIEM) and also president of
the National Assembly's recently-created Commission on Economic Affairs. "The economic crisis is
complicated by the inefficient use of the work force, and as a result, there are a series of goods and
services that the state cannot adequately supply under present circumstances." Under one decree
announced on Sept. 9, the government outlined 118 crafts and services which workers interested
in running their own shops can now produce independently from the government. Those activities
until now completely controlled by the state include such diverse services as repairs for homes
and machinery, plumbing, hair styling, cooking, painting, and even computer programming. A
broad array of crafts will be allowed, ranging from shoe making to carpentry. The right to run one's
own business, however, is limited to non-management workers, especially people unemployed
or underemployed, as well as homemakers and retired citizens. University graduates particularly
doctors, company directors, and management personnel are barred from independent private
activities in order to avoid a drain of trained professionals and technicians away from the public
sector. Independent businesses will be allowed to negotiate prices for their products directly with
buyers, but no intermediary commerce will be permitted. In addition, no employees can be hired in
any of the new enterprises. The second decree, announced on Sept. 15, authorizes the fragmentation
of inefficiently-run large state farms into small- and medium-sized cooperatives to be directly
managed by the workforce independently from the government. In addition, small parcels of land
not being used by state farms will be granted to individual workers and retired citizens to grow
food for family consumption. On the cooperatives, all produce must be sold to the state, which
will instruct those enterprises on the main crops to be planted and set production goals. But the
cooperative members will split profits among themselves, and will be permitted to autonomously
run their own finances, organize their production, and manage their own resources. "They will
have use of the land for an indefinite period...they will be the owners of what they produce, and
they will operate their own bank accounts," read a statement by the Communist Party Politburo
after the decree was announced. "These innovations are aimed at making agricultural production
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more efficient by providing incentives to motivate workers to increase the volume of production at
the lowest possible cost." Despite social costs, reforms necessary for survival All told, the reforms
enacted since July represent radical changes in government policy. Officials say such changes are
essential both to confront the present economic crisis, as well as to pave the way for growth in the
medium to long term once recovery sets in. Indeed, some of the measures could carry important
social and political costs. Even government officials, for example, admit that the dollar legalization
will lead to income inequality among the population since many Cubans will not have access to
dollars. Such income disparity undermines the revolution's much-heralded policy of equitably
distributing goods among all Cubans. "There will be a social impact in the sense that it will create
greater differences between people than we have today and greater differences that we have been
used to in these years of the revolution," said Carlos Lage, who is now considered the country's
leading economic strategist. Many foreign economists warn that resentment is likely to emerge
even among those citizens who remain firmly committed to the revolution, since privileges will
no longer go to the hardest workers or political loyalists, but to those who get the most help from
relatives abroad. "You're whittling away at the legitimacy of the regime and the governability of
the system," said Damian Fernandez, an international relations professor at Florida International
University. "You no longer have to work for the state since your aunt in Miami can be feeding
you." Many workers will likely be tempted to leave peso-earning state jobs to either work in service
positions connected to the tourist sector, or simply live off of income from relatives abroad. At
present, the average Cuban worker makes about 200 pesos per month, the equivalent of about US
$3.00 on the black market exchange. "What happens when a taxi driver earns two, three, four, five
times as much as a doctor makes," said Andrew Zimbalist. "The measures are going to raise issues
over the government's ability to stimulate production." Nevertheless, the government insists that,
since it is unlikely Cuba will ever be able to find new socialist trading partners willing to replace the
subsidized markets it lost in Eastern Europe, the country is forced to accept the social and political
costs of economic reform to reinsert itself into the world economy. "All these measures are part
of a process of adapting the Cuban economy to the new world circumstances," said CIEM head
Osvaldo Martinez. "The Cuban economy is confronting a world market whose logic and rules of
the game are capitalist, and in which it also has to face problems like unequal trade. The solution is
to reactivate production, correct internal imbalances, and begin a process of economic revival and
growth on the basis of a more efficient national economy." In fact, officials say that the process of
reform is gaining a momentum of its own, since many of the new policies already enacted will create
the need for even more changes in the coming months. "It's a permanent process of adaptation
of the life of the economy of the country to the new circumstances," said Carlos Lage. "We know
that the new measures will generate other measures, and so on successively. Something that
seems unacceptable for us today we may have to consider tomorrow." Among the next measures
already under consideration is a plan to reduce excess liquidity in the economy to revalue the
peso. According to government estimates, some 9 billion excess pesos are now in circulation,
since scarcities of most products on the domestic have forced Cubans to simply dump much of
their earnings into savings since 1990. Osvaldo Martinez says the government is now considering
imposing taxes to soak up pesos, including special levies on foreign investment on the island, on
state enterprises, and on all private activities, such as the newly formed craft and service enterprises.
By reducing liquidity, according to Martinez, the government would encourage greater worker
productivity. "The problem of excess liquidity is a major disincentive for workers," said Martinez.
"It discourages workers from efficiently dedicating themselves to their work, and even discourages
them from showing up at their jobs." Moreover, by cutting the amount of pesos in circulation the
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government could pave the way for the eventual establishment of a currency convertibility scheme
to facilitate greater use of foreign exchange in the economy, another measure which Martinez says
is now under consideration. "I believe we have to steadily work toward rescuing the purchasing
power of national currency so that eventually realistic exchange rates could be established to freely
convert the peso into foreign currencies," said Martinez. "Realistic exchange rates are necessary to
stimulate tourism, capital investment, and foreign trade, although such measures would have to
be implemented at a later stage in the economic reform process." Finally, the government is likely
to allow even greater space in the coming months for Cubans to set up privately-run productive
enterprises. One initiative under consideration is the establishment of a free farmers' market,
whereby small agricultural producers would be allowed to produce goods for sale on an open
domestic market, rather than to the state. In general, the reforms implemented so far and those now
under consideration are seen as the first steps toward a mixed economy in Cuba. The government
says it is replacing "socialist orthodoxy" with "economic realism," whereby the central goal now is
to maintain some of the basic achievements of the revolution such as free health care and education
for all while sacrificing socialist ideals that are now too costly too maintain. "There are two different
sets of things: the things we have to do to perfect socialism and the things we have to do for the
revolution to survive," said President Fidel Castro. "Today we cannot speak of the purely ideal,
perfect socialism we dream of because life forces us into concessions...but we will work to at least
preserve the best conquests of socialism." [Sources: Journal of Commerce, 07/13/93; Financial Times
(London), 07/17/93; Washington Post, 06/27/93, 07/25/93; Agencia Latinoamericana de Informacion,
07/27/93; Miami Herald, 07/12/93, 07/17/93, 07/30/93; Deutsche Press Agentur, 07/26/93, 07/27/93,
09/09/93; Agence France-Presse, 06/04/93, 06/09/93, 06/10/93, 06/25/93, 07/16/93, 07/17/93, 07/19/93,
07/26/93, 07/29/93, 08/09/93, 08/14/93, 08/19/93, 09/07/93, 09/15/93, 09/17/93; Reuter, 06/22/93,
07/01/93, 07/07/93, 07/12/93, 07/13/93, 07/16/93, 07/19/93, 07/26/93, 07/27/93, 07/29/93, 08/03-05/93,
08/09/93, 08/10/93, 08/14/93, 08/20/93, 08/21/93, 08/31/93, 09/08/93, 09/09/93, 09/17/93, 09/21/93;
Spanish news service EFE, 06/02/93, 06/19/93, 07/19/93, 07/26/93, 07/27/93, 08/14/93, 08/15/93,
09/21/93; United Press International, 07/26/93, 09/29/93, 09/22/93; New York Times, 08/16/93,
09/10/93, 09/20/93, 09/29/93; Washington Report on the Hemisphere, 10/03/93; Notimex, 07/26/93,
08/31/93, 09/09/93, 09/17/93, 10/08/93; Associated Press, 06/28/93, 06/29/93, 07/15/93, 07/16/93,
07/18/93, 07/20/93, 07/23/93, 07/26/93, 07/28/93, 08/08/93, 08/10/93, 08/14/93, 08/19/93, 09/06/93,
09/07/93, 09/09/93, 09/15/93, 10/05/93, 10/08/93]
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